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Abstract
Consider a two-class unobservable priority queue, with Poisson arrivals, gener-
ally distributed service, and strategic customers. Customers are charged a fee
when joining the premium class. We analyze the maximum revenue achievable
under the non-preemptive (NP) and preemptive-resume (PR) policies, and show
that a provider is always better off implementing the PR policy. Further, the
maximum revenue under PR is sometimes achieved when only a fraction of the
customers join the premium class.
Keywords: Game Theory, Queuing Theory, Preemption, Pricing.
1. Introduction
Priority scheduling is utilized in many contexts in order to triage service to
those who require more urgent service, or to enable a separate revenue stream by
customers paying an additional fee to upgrade to higher priority service. In this
work, we consider strategic behavior under an M |G|1 queue with two classes,
where customers have the option to pay a fee to upgrade to the higher priority
class. In particular, our focus is on the provider’s revenue management, the
stability of the resulting equilibrium, and the resulting social welfare. Under
this model, we show that under a non-preemptive (NP) policy, the provider
always has incentive to charge a fee such that all customers purchase a priority
upgrade in order to maximize revenue. In contrast, under preemptive-resume
(PR), for sufficiently high variance in service times and low traffic loads, revenues
are maximized when the upgrade fee is at a level when only some customers
are willing to purchase an upgrade. Otherwise, revenues are maximized when
charging a fee where all customers will purchase an upgrade, as in NP.
In any event, the revenue-maximizing fee yields a stable equilibrium, and
thus the provider is guaranteed to receive the maximum revenue by setting
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the fee accordingly. This holds regardless of the preemption policy, variance
in service times, or traffic load. Furthermore, for any given traffic load and
service time variance the provider will always have incentive to implement the
PR policy over the NP one.
1.1. Related Work
Analyses of performance of non-preemptive priority queues has been done
for contexts including traffic routing over networks [1], hospital management [2],
and smart grids [3]. Under these works however, customers/objects are tagged
with class membership based upon predetermined characteristics and cannot
purchase the ability to upgrade. Strategic behavior under preemptive-resume
models are considered in [4, pp 83-85], [5], [6]. However, these models explicitly
or implicitly assume an M |M |1 queue to be in effect. Further, while two [5] or
an arbitrary number of classes [6] are considered in the latter two works, there
is no option to upgrade between classes, and thus the problem being considered
is not identical to the one analyzed here. In [4, pp 83-85], customers are able
to pay an upgrade fee. However, as it too is based on an M |M |1 queue, it is
asserted that mixed equilibria states will never be stable. As determined in the
analysis of the M |G|1 version of the model in [7], this does not hold in general,
which has implications for a revenue maximizing provider as noted below.
2. Game Model
Our model is based on an unobservable M |G|1 priority queue, similar to
that analyzed in [7]. To keep the paper self-contained, we summarize in this
section key results of [7], which serve as the basis of our main findings presented
in Section 3. In this queue, customers are by default assigned to the ordinary
class, but on entry may pay an optional fee C to join the premium class. We
assume that paying C only impacts a customer’s priority class, and not the
actual service. We use the standard notation to denote the mean arrival rate
(λ), mean service rate (µ), and traffic load (ρ = λ/µ). In addition, C is used to
indicate the fee to join the premium class, φ denotes the fraction of customers
who have joined the premium class, and K is a variance parameter defined such
that the second moment of service is equal to K/µ2.
We consider customer and provider behavior under the non-preemptive and
preemptive-resume policies. The possible equilibria states depend on the cus-
tomers’ decisions, which in turn depend on the time spent waiting for service
and the fee C. Letting E[Wp] be the time spent waiting for service as a member
of the premium class, and E[Wo] be the time spent waiting for service as a
member of the ordinary class, there are three possible equilibria states:
1. All join (i.e. φ = 1): E[Wp] + C < E[Wo] for all φ.
2. None join (i.e. φ = 0): E[Wp] + C > E[Wo] for all φ.
3. Some join (i.e. E[Wp] + C = E[Wo] for some φ ∈ (0, 1)): Customers are
indifferent, and join the premium class with probability φ.
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2.1. Equilibria under the NP policy
The cost function associated with the NP policy is given as follows:
CNP (φ) = Kρ
2
2µ(1− ρ)(1 − φρ) . (1)
Evaluating this function, we find that regardless of the values of the pa-
rameters K and ρ, this is always a monotone increasing function in φ. Thus
it has the following equilibrium structure. If C < CNP (0), all join is the
unique equilibrium. If C > CNP (1), none join is the unique equilibrium.
If CNP (0) < C < CNP (1), all join, none join, and some join equilibrium
φ = 1/ρ − (Kρ)/(2µC(1 − ρ) are all possible equilibria. The pure all join
and none join equilibria are always stable. The mixed some join equilibrium is
never stable.
2.2. Equilibria under the PR policy
The cost function for the PR policy is derived as follows:
CPR(φ) = Kρ+ (2 −K)φρ(1− ρ)
2µ(1− ρ)(1 − φρ) . (2)
Unlike CNP (φ), this function’s behavior depends on the values of K and ρ,
although it is always monotone or constant:
1. If K > 2 and ρ < (K − 2)/(2K − 2), CPR(φ) is monotone decreasing.
2. Else, if K > 2 and ρ = (K − 2)/(2K − 2), CPR(φ) is constant valued.
3. Otherwise, CPR(φ) is monotone increasing.
This in turn influences the equilibrium structure under preemptive-resume.
In particular, there are circumstances in which the some join equilibrium will
be stable. If the some join equilibrium exists, it is the solution to CPR(φ) = C,
and we denote this by
φe =
2µC(1− ρ)Kρ
ρ(1 − ρ)(2µC + 2−K) .
If C < min C(φ), all join is the unique equilibrium. If C > max C(φ), none join
is the unique equilibrium. If min C(φ) < C < max C(φ), and C(φ) is monotone
decreasing, the some join equilibrium φ = φe is the unique equilibrium. If
min C(φ) < C < max C(φ), and C(φ) is monotone increasing, the equilibrium
outcomes are similar to those of the NP policy.
With the equilibria states established, we now turn to analyzing the revenues
collected from customers upgrading to the premium class under each preemption
policy.
3
3. Revenue Management
As noted, the customers’ decision of whether to join the premium class or
not depends on the cost of waiting as a member of each class. This decision
is influenced by the joining fee C, which is controlled by the provider. As the
provider is rational, they are interested in maximizing their revenues, and thus
will set C appropriate. However, as seen in the previous section, not all possible
equilibria are stable. In particular, any time a some join state is unstable, a
none join equilibrium is possible. In such a case, there is a risk the provider
would not collect any revenue from customers upgrading to the premium class.
Thus, we define and analyze a revenue function for each preemption policy
in order to determine the equilibrium corresponding to the provider’s maximum
revenue. We also whether whether that equilibrium is stable. While revenue is
defined in terms of the cost and the total number of customers purchasing the
upgrade, the latter is not knowable until the completion of service. Thus, we
define the revenue R(φ) in terms of average revenue per time unit. Given an
arrival rate of λ, and the fraction φ of customers, we derive the revenue function
as
R(φ) = λφC(φ). (3)
We further denote the maximum revenue under each preemption policy as
R∗ = maxφ∈[0,1]R(φ).
3.1. NP Model
Under the NP policy, the corresponding revenue function is derived from the
definition in Equation (3) and CNP (φ) as follows:
RNP (φ) = Kρ
3φ
2(1− ρ)(1− φρ) . (4)
Evaluating the derivative of RNP (φ), we determine that for all K and ρ, the
function is monotone increasing. As a result, the maximum revenue is obtained
when φ = 1. The resulting maximum revenue is equal to
R∗NP = RNP (1) =
Kρ3
2(1− ρ)2 . (5)
Thus, under the non-preemptive policy, the variance in service and the traf-
fic load will influence the revenue collected, but the provider will always have
incentive to set the fee C to be equal to CNP (1). As shown below, this is not
necessarily the case under the preemptive-resume policy.
3.2. PR Model
Under the PR policy, the corresponding revenue function is derived from
Equations (3) and (2) as
RPR(φ) = Kφρ
2 + (2 −K)φ2ρ2(1− ρ)
2(1− ρ)(1 − φρ) (6)
4
Unlike under NP, this revenue function’s behavior does depend on the values
of K and ρ. To show this, we compute the derivative with respect to φ:
R′PR(φ) =
ρ2
(
2φ(1− ρ)(2− φρ) +K(1− φ(1 − ρ)(2− φρ)
)
2(1− ρ)(1− φρ)2 . (7)
Evaluating the expression, we determine that the sign of the derivative (and
thus the increasing/decreasing behavior of RPR(φ)) depends solely on the sign
of the expression
2φ(1− ρ)(2 − φρ) +K(1− φ(1− ρ)(2 − φρ).
Given the restrictions on the parameters, K ∈ [1,∞) and ρ ∈ (0, 1), we solve
for where the expression is positive to determine where RPR(φ) is increasing.
In doing so, we determine the following: If 1 ≤ K ≤ 4, RPR(φ) is monotone
increasing regardless of the value of ρ. If K > 4, RPR(φ) is monotone increasing
if ρ ∈ [3/2− (1/2)
√
(5K − 2)/(K − 2), 1). If K > 4, RPR(φ) is unimodal with
a unique maximum if ρ ∈ (0, 3/2− (1/2)
√
(5K − 2)/(K − 2)).
In the first two cases, the monotone increasing behavior of RPR(φ) results
in the maximum revenue being achieved when φ = 1. Thus, R∗PR = RPR(1),
which equals
Kρ2 + (2−K)ρ2(1− ρ)
2(1− ρ)2 . (8)
However, when K > 4, and ρ < 3/2− (1/2)
√
(5K − 2)/(K − 2), RPR(φ) is
unimodal with a unique maximum. As a result, the revenue is maximized at a
some join equilibrium. The value of φ which maximizes RPR(φ) is
φmax =
1
ρ
(
1−
√
K − 2− 2ρ(K − 1)
(K − 2)(1− ρ)
)
.
The corresponding maximum revenue is equal to
R∗PR =
2(K − 2)− ρ(3K − 4)
2(1− ρ) − (K − 2)
√
K − 2− 2ρ(K − 1)
(K − 2)(1− ρ) . (9)
3.3. Equilibrium Stability and Guarantee of Maximum Revenue
Having determined the values of the maximum possible revenue, we face
the question of whether the provider is actually guaranteed to receive such
revenue if the fee C is set accordingly, due to the existence of potentially unstable
equilibria. However, we assert that this is not the case here.
Theorem 1. The provider is always guaranteed to receive their maximum possi-
ble revenue if C is set accordingly, regardless of the preemption policy, variance
in service times, or traffic load.
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Proof. For the NP policy, this is straightforward, since per Equation (5), the
maximum revenue is obtained when φ = 1. This corresponds to the all join
equilibrium, which is always stable, and thus the revenue is guaranteed.
In the PR policy, this holds for the same reason so long as RPR(φ) is mono-
tone increasing. Thus, assume that RPR(φ) is unimodal with a unique maxi-
mum. In this case, φmax is a mixed equilibrium. Mixed equilibria are stable so
long as the corresponding cost function CPR(φ) is itself monotone decreasing.
Thus, if CPR(φ) is shown to be monotone decreasing under these circum-
stances, then φmax is ESS stable and thus the corresponding revenue is guaran-
teed. CPR(φ) is monotone decreasing when K > 2 and ρ < (K − 2)/(2K − 2).
RPR(φ) is unimodal if K > 4 and ρ < 3/2− (1/2)
√
(5K − 2)/(K − 2).
Thus, clearly the condition on the service variance parameter K is satisfied,
and thus we must simply show that for K > 4, the inequality
3
2
− 1
2
√
5K − 2
K − 2 <
K − 2
2K − 2
holds. Solving for K, we determine that the inequality holds if K < 0 or
K > 2, thus it certainly holds when K > 4. Therefore the traffic load resulting
in a unimodal RPR(φ) is in the range which results in a monotone decreasing
CPR(φ). Therefore, the resulting revenue maximizing equilibrium φmax is stable
and therefore the maximum revenue is guaranteed.
With the maximum revenues guaranteed to be obtained if C is set accord-
ingly by the provider, we next consider which preemption policy will result in
the greatest revenues from customer upgrades.
3.4. Comparison of Maximum Revenues
As the provider is rational and selects the preemption policy in effect, they
are incentivized to select the policy which corresponds to the greater maximum
revenue for a given traffic load ρ and variance in service as denoted by K. We
claim that regardless of the traffic load or variance in service, a rational revenue
maximizing provider will always implement a preemptive-resume policy:
Theorem 2. Consider a two class M |G|1 queuing model, where customers pay
a fee C if they wish to upgrade to the premium class. The provider is always
better off implementing the preemptive-resume policy, as the maximum revenue
under the non-preemptive policy is always lower.
Proof. Let ρ and K be arbitrary but fixed. There are two cases to consider
based on the behavior of the corresponding RPR(φ).
Assume that RPR(φ) is monotone increasing, thus R∗PR is defined as in
Equation (8). Comparing this to R∗NP as defined in Equation (5), we claim the
following holds if RPR(φ) is monotone increasing:
Kρ2 + (2−K)ρ2(1 − ρ)
2(1− ρ)2 >
Kρ3
2(1− ρ)2 .
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This reduces to determining whether 2(1 − ρ)ρ2 > 0, which is true for all ρ ∈
(0, 1), and is independent ofK. Thus, R∗PR > R∗NP in the case whereRPR(φ) is
monotone increasing. In fact, this result shows that RPR(1) > R∗PR in general.
This implies that as expected, R∗PR > R∗NP as well when RPR(φ) is unimodal.
Therefore, we find that regardless of the variance in service time distribution,
and regardless of the traffic load, the provider is always best off implementing
the preemptive-resume policy in order to maximize their revenues.
3.5. Impact on Social Welfare
We now turn to a brief analysis of how the maximum revenue situation
impacts the social welfare of the system. Under this model, the social welfare is
defined in terms of the average wait time across all customers, as all other costs
are either fixed or are a transfer of payment between players [7]:
S(φ) = φE[Wp] + (1− φ)E[Wo] (10)
Under the non-preemptive policy, we determine that the social welfare is
constant valued, a result we expect as wait times in an M |G|1-NP queue are
known to be constant with respect to the reordering of customers:
SNP (φ) = Kρ
2µ(1− ρ) . (11)
Thus, under NP, the provider does not impact the overall welfare by behaving
in a revenue maximizing fashion. However, under the preemptive-resume pol-
icy, social welfare is not constant as preemption behaviors impact the overall
wait times due to the differences between the service time of the preempting
customer, and the residual service of the customer being preempted. The social
welfare function under PR is derived from the definition as follows
SPR(φ) =
ρ
(
K − 2φρ+ (2−K)φ(1 − φ(1− ρ)
)
2µ(1− ρ)(1− φρ) (12)
Here, the value of K determines which states are socially optimal: If K < 2,
the socially optimal states are the pure equilibria states φ ∈ {0, 1}. If K = 2,
all equilibria states are socially optimal. If K > 2, the socially optimal state is
the some join equilibrium
φ∗ =
1−√1− ρ
ρ
.
From this, we conclude that a revenue maximizing provider also acts in the
socially optimal manner whenever K ≤ 2. If K > 2, this is not the case. In fact,
for 2 < K ≤ 4, we find that a revenue maximizing provider is in the worst case
social outcome, as the all join equilibrium leads to the longest expected wait
times. When K > 4, under sufficiently low traffic loads the worst case outcome
is avoided. However, the revenue maximizing equilibrium will never be socially
optimal under these circumstances.
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4. Conclusions
In this work, we analyzed an M |G|1 queue with two priority classes where
customers are strategic and have the ability to upgrade to a premium class.
We compared the maximum provider’s revenue under the non-preemptive and
preemptive-resume policies, and showed that a rational provider is always best
off implementing the preemptive-resume policy. Further, under sufficiently high
variance in service and low traffic loads, there exist scenarios where the revenue
is maximized by only a fraction of the customers joining the premium class.
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